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Russia’s political system has frequently been criticised by Western politicians and commentators,
with some observers drawing parallels between the rule of Vladimir Putin and the old Soviet regime
during the communist-era. But how accurate are these criticisms? Andrei P. Tsygankov writes that
a particular narrative which views Russia as a ‘neo-Soviet autocracy’ has built up in western media
sources. He argues that this narrative ignores the reality of Putin’s regime and serves simply to
legitimise the identity of the United States and the American-led ‘free world’ relative to that of an
‘oppressive’ Russia.
Advocates of Western-style democracy frequently assert that Russia has built a neo-Soviet ‘autocratic’ political
system with elements of totalitarianism. Struggling to understand the country’s transition from the USSR, Western
media commonly describe Russia in terms of its ﬁtting with the old pattern. Contemporary Russian politics is
assessed not on the scale of how far it has gotten away from the Soviet Union, but, rather, how much Russia
became a Soviet-like ‘one-party state’ driven by a ‘KGB mentality’ and dependent on the use of propaganda, ‘Cold
War rhetoric’, and repressions against internal opposition in order to consolidate state power.
Surveying editorials in leading American newspapers, it is easy to be struck by the power of the neo-Soviet
autocracy narrative. Violations, irregularities, and improvisations in Russia’s political life are now typically attributed
by the U.S. media to the Kremlin’s fear of opposition and the overly centralised, non-accountable system of
governance.
Such consistency is accomplished by the presence of a coherent narrative of Russia. In particular, the U.S. media
sustains and promotes the binary narrative that juxtaposes and contrasts the vision of a morally inferior neo-Soviet
Russia with that of a superior American system. For example, while explaining the Kremlin’s growing mistrust in the
United States, the Washington Post advanced the following interpretation:
With former KGB oﬃcer Vladimir Putin in charge, Russia has become increasingly closed in many
ways. Historical archives that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 welcomed scholars from
all nations have re-shut their doors. Television has fallen back under government control.
International organizations have been pushed out of Russia, and independent nonproﬁt groups in
Russia have been squeezed, harassed and threatened. Russia is essentially a one-party state, as it
was 20 years ago.
The United States by contrast is wide open. Unlike American organizations in Russia, the Russian
government is welcome to hire public relations ﬁrms here, put Russian programming on cable
television and distribute its message as it sees ﬁt. Its diplomats are welcome to attend think-tank
seminars in Washington, and the give-and-take of American politics is an open book for them.
Key references here include characterisations of Russia as “closed”, associated with the KGB, the Soviet Union,
and “government control” as well as presentation of the United States as “by contrast” “wide open” including to
inﬂuences by the Russian government.
Overall, while promising not ‘to ignore the dark side’ of Russia’s political system with its corruption, selective use of
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law, and low tolerance for opposition, the American press has ignored all other sides of Russia by making the ‘dark
side’ central to its coverage. By exploiting misleading historical analogies, it has oﬀered one-sided interpretations of
complex processes, and ignored areas of political development that do not ﬁt the narrative. In particular, the U.S.
media has failed to notice political areas not controlled by the government, sources of support for Putin not related to
the Kremlin’s ‘relentless propaganda’, and actions by the Russian state that do not ﬁt the description of ‘dictatorial
power’.
Parallels to Soviet (totalitarian) practices are
misleading not only because they make no distinction
between Stalin and post-Stalin developments, but
also because they present the Soviet experience as
the only signiﬁcant one for understanding Russia’s
historical trajectory. If, however, the contemporary
Russian system does not ﬁt expectations of a
Western-style democracy, this does not yet make this
system a Soviet or neo-Soviet one.
Instead, Russia reaches back to its centuries-long
political experience before communism. After the
stiﬂing decades of communism, historical thinking is
being revived inside the country. Rather than making
references to the Soviet past, Russian analysts more
commonly resort to analogies of the Times of Trouble
(smuta), Dual Power (dvoyevlastiye), In-Between-
Tsardom (mezhdutsarstviye), or other historically
meaningful terms. Although the U.S. media makes
occasional references to ‘czarist’ practices, it is much more comfortable with the Soviet parallels – arguably,
because it knows too little of Russia’s pre-Soviet history and its diﬀerences from the Soviet period.
The strong state system Russia is aiming to revive is not what the editors of the New York Times or Washington
Post have in mind when they discuss Russia’s ‘autocracy’. The strong state is not to be confused with totalitarianism
or unlimited control over private and public life. Even tsarist autocracy (samoderzhaviye) was largely respectful of
established social and political boundaries, as the Church, nationality, and the self-governing institutions served as
informal constraints on the Tsar’s power.
The post-Soviet state also does not seek to eliminate competition in economic and political life, as the Soviet regime
did. Instead, the Kremlin wants to shape and inﬂuence such competition. State shares in economic corporations, the
designation of Dmitry Medvedev as Putin’s successor, attempts to inﬂuence institutions of civil society by creating
the Public Chamber from above, providing grants to Russian NGOs though a competitive process, and initiating
changes in the legislature to limit foreign inﬂuences in Russian politics are all examples of such state eﬀorts to
inﬂuence competition.
As Graeme Robertson writes, under such a hybrid regime, “competition is less something that authoritarians have
failed to eliminate, but rather something that they consciously allow and try to control”. Despite additional limitations
placed by the state on political competition in the country following the Ukraine crisis, areas of freedom in Russia are
signiﬁcant, especially when compared to the Soviet period. Alternative news coverage remains available, as the
internet, newspapers, and some radio and television channels are largely free of state control.
The U.S. media is also incorrect to assume that high levels of public support for Putin predominantly results from the
Kremlin’s ‘relentless propaganda’ and that ‘when given a real democratic choice, millions of Russians will reject
Putinism’. Perceiving a strong state rule as illegitimate and backed up primarily by propaganda and force has been a
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common Western error in judging bases of political stability in Russia. In practice, many Russians historically
supported a strong state and did not view it as internally oppressive.
They justiﬁed such a system by the needs of internal development and security from outside threats. Russia’s vast
size, geopolitical vulnerability, and economic underdevelopment dictated that the ruled ones would have
considerable support for a highly centralised system. Of course, Russian rulers diﬀered. Some of them neglected the
need for internal development and engaged in risky international adventures, while others used their time wisely by
formulating long-term objectives and mobilising the required resources. Public support for rulers varied too, but it
has been largely supportive of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ strong state, rather than a Western-style democracy.
Finally, it is misleading to view Putin as a ruler with dictatorial power responsible for all the achievements and ﬂaws
of Russia’s political system. Comparisons between Putin and Stalin are common in the U.S. media, yet there is little
appreciation of Putin’s administrative weakness and inability to deliver on his own promises. The Russian state is
frequently ineﬀective in dealing with serious problems: from mobilising economic resources to solving crimes. The
U.S. media occasionally alludes to this, but it is more typical to assign Putin responsibility for the murders of
journalists or opposition politicians, terrorist acts, and other grave developments in Russian politics.
In cultural and political terms, the neo-Soviet autocracy narrative serves to legitimise the identity of the United States
and the American-led ‘free world’ relative to that of the ‘oppressive’ Russia. To American elites, Russia makes an
important public enemy because, arguably, no other country has challenged U.S. values and interests as vigorously
and persistently as Russia. The U.S. media reﬂects fear of the strong state system by presenting it as a mirror
image of the American system and grossly simplifying Russia’s complex transformation. The narrative assists the
media in engaging with the U.S. public in part because old Cold War views have not entirely disappeared from the
public mind and have not been replaced by a diﬀerent understanding of new realities. As the media has not
presented an alternative Russian narrative, American society remains receptive to the dominant perspective.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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